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CLD-232       NOT PRECEDENTIAL  
    
   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 11-2226 
 ___________ 
 
 MICHAEL SHARPE, 
Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 J.T. SHARTLE, Warden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-02355 ) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Noel L. Hillman 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to 
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6(a) 
July 8, 2011 
 Before:  RENDELL, FUENTES, and SMITH, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed:  August 3, 2011) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael Sharpe, a pro se prisoner, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily 
affirm.  See I.O.P. 10.6. 
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I. 
 In October 2003, following a jury trial in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
Sharpe was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery and receiving stolen firearms.  In 
June 2004, he pled guilty in two separate cases to possession of a firearm by a convicted 
felon and assault on a federal employee, and carrying a firearm in relation to a crime of 
violence, respectively.  He was sentenced in one proceeding and received concurrent 
sentences for all charges.  Sharpe also waived his appellate rights, and his right to 
collaterally attack his conviction.  The written judgment was entered in June 2005.  
However, the document mistakenly states that Sharpe pled guilty to assault on a federal 
employee in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 111
1
 and 114 (maiming within maritime and 
territorial jurisdiction), instead of §§ 111 and 1114 (assault on a federal officer). 
 Sharpe did not appeal, but on April 30, 2007, he filed a pro se motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  He raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial and 
judicial misconduct, coercion in regard to the guilty plea, and actual innocence.  The 
sentencing court denied the motion as time-barred, and in the alternative, held that his 
waiver should be upheld and that his claims lacked merit.  We declined to issue a 
certificate of appealability.  Sharpe later filed a motion for correction or modification of 
the record, arguing that he was actually innocent of assault on a federal officer, which 
was denied.   
                                                 
1
 Section 111 makes it a crime to forcibly assault, resist, oppose, impede, intimidate or 
interfere with any person designated in Section 1114 of Title 18, while engaged in or on 
account of the performance of official duty.  Thus, § 1114 specifies the federal employees 
that § 111 makes it a crime to assault. 
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 In April 2011, Sharpe filed a habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the 
District Court.  Sharpe asked the Court to withdraw his guilty plea and vacate his 
judgment of sentence on the following grounds: (1) because he is actually innocent of 
violating 18 U.S.C. § 114 and relief under § 2255 is no longer available, § 2255 is 
inadequate and ineffective for his actual innocence claim; (2) his guilty plea violates Rule 
11 because he was never advised that he was pleading guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 114, and 
understood he was charged with and was pleading guilty to 18 U.S.C. § 1114;
2
 (3) 
counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and accurately advise Petitioner what he 
was pleading guilty to; (4) the conviction and sentence violate due process.  The District 
Court dismissed the petition and Sharpe timely appealed. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous 
standard to its factual findings.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 
538 (3d Cir. 2002).  We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because this 
appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.   
 A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the primary means to collaterally 
challenge a federal conviction or sentence.  See In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 249 (3d 
Cir. 1997).  We have held that the District Court may not consider claims properly 
brought under § 2255 in a § 2241 habeas corpus petition unless § 2255 would provide an 
                                                 
2
 The plea agreement clearly states that Sharpe agreed to plead guilty to § 1114. 
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“inadequate or ineffective” means of relief.  See Application of Galante, 437 F.2d 1164, 
1165 (3d Cir. 1971). 
 Sharpe’s challenges to his sentence are within the scope of claims cognizable 
under § 2255, and thus he may not seek relief under § 2241.  The mere fact that Sharpe is 
prevented by the gatekeeping requirements of § 2255(h) from litigating his present claims 
does not mean that § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective.  See Cradle v. United States ex 
rel. Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538-39 (3d Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (“It is the inefficacy of the 
remedy, not the personal inability to use it, that is determinative.”). 3 
 As Sharpe’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm the 
order of the District Court.  See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.   
 
                                                 
3
 We note that in June 2011, the sentencing court, pursuant to Rule 36 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, corrected the clerical error contained in the written 
judgment to reflect that Sharpe was adjudicated guilty of § 1114, rather than § 114. 
 
